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Abstract—Despite much research effort key distribution in
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) still remains an open problem.
In this paper we address this issue by proposing a simple identity-
based key agreement scheme. Our protocol uses Identity-Based
Cryptography (IBC) and secret key pre-distribution. We argue
that IBC is in many ways a perfect solution for WSNs. It reduces
the number of required keys, simplifying the key management
in the network, and has a lower communications overhead than
traditional public key protocols.
We evaluate our proposal on a broad range of sensor platforms
to show its efficiency on different CPU architectures. A complete
key agreement procedure takes less than 3s on a resource-
constrained Tmote Sky node without requiring any communica-
tion between two parties. To our knowledge this work is the first
practical implementation of a complete IBC scheme on sensor
devices.
We identify a range of WSN applications which would benefit
from the incorporation of a security architecture, and show that
the scheme described here makes it feasible to deploy these
applications in the real world.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) can be considered as
one of the most constrained pervasive systems with minimal
resources. One of the main challenges in this research area is to
provide reliable security services that overcome the limitations
in terms of available power, computational capabilities and
storage resources. A typical WSN node has an 8-bit micro-
controller, 4KB of RAM, 128KB of program space, and is
battery operated. Providing security in a distributed network
comprising of such devices is a challenging task that needs
new cryptographic solutions.
Sensor networks are often deployed over wide areas that in
many cases are open to the public. This environment poses
a threat of physical node capture. Typical low-cost devices
will not have secure storage for cryptographic keys or tamper-
proof hardware. An active attacker may easily subvert a node,
intercept messages and decode them using the derived secret
key.
WSNs also pose additional challenges that need to be
addressed in the proposed security solution. One is the limited
bandwidth available for communication. Devices are usually
low-powered with a short battery life span. Wireless trans-
mission is very expensive in terms of energy usage. Current
radio transceivers use as much as ten times more energy than
the node’s CPU [14]. Hence the cryptographic scheme should
minimize the communication overhead needed to provide
security.
Additionally networks may consist of a large number of
nodes which requires a scalable security protocol. The number
of necessary cryptographic keys must be small due to very
limited memory resources and to facilitate the scalability of the
security scheme. For the same reason the key length should be
short, but on the other hand long enough to provide a sufficient
level of security.
Wireless communication between sensor nodes is insecure
by its nature and requires cryptographic methods to ensure data
confidentiality and message integrity. WSNs need also entity
authentication and access to the network resources should be
restricted allowing only genuine nodes to participate in data
exchange. In order to satisfy all of these security goals we need
to use Public Key Cryptography (PKC) methods for providing
security.
Typical security solutions for WSNs use basic symmetric
key algorithms [10] due to their simplicity and efficiency in
resources utilisation. The exclusive usage of fast and energy
efficient symmetric cryptography primitives may seem an
obvious choice for constrained sensor devices, but in reality
it does not solve the security problem. In typical real-life
WSN deployments a network-wide key is used (e.g. in the
residential mode in ZigBee WSNs [24]), which can be easily
compromised. Such a security system is insufficient for many
WSN applications, especially those that deal with critical data.
Our ID-based key agreement scheme addresses the above
issues and solves the key distribution problem in sensor
networks.
II. KEY DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
The key distribution and management problem is one of
the main security issues in sensor networks. In general there
are three classes of key agreement schemes: trusted server
mechanisms, public-key algorithms and key predistribution
schemes. The first type uses central servers to issue certificates
and to setup the whole public key infrastructure. This method
is certainly far too complex for constrained systems with low
power and low computing capabilities. Public key techniques
use asymmetric cryptography which is more heavyweight than
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TABLE I
IDENTITY BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY VS OTHER SECURITY SCHEMES FOR WSNS.
Symmetric key cryptography Public key cryptography Identity based cryptography
Computational complexity Low High High
Communication overhead Low High Low
Key distribution Problematic Complex Simple
Number of keys O(n2) O(n) n
Key directory At each node At each node or key center No
Non-repudiation No Yes Yes
Forward encryption No No Yes
symmetric algorithms and requires authentication of public
keys. The third approach to key establishment is via predistri-
bution, where nodes are loaded with keying material before
their deployment [6]. Those schemes are mainly based on
random key distribution - neighbouring nodes share a common
key in terms of probability. This is a major drawback of
such mechanisms, because we do not have a guarantee that
a perfect connectivity between communicating parties can be
established. This approach is also impractical for large scale
sensor networks.
A. Identity-Based Cryptography
In this paper we propose a practical identity-based key
distribution mechanism which does not require interaction
between nodes to agree upon session keys. We use Identity-
Based Cryptography (IBC) [19] and secret key predistribution
to solve the key distribution problem. IBC is a public key tech-
nique that uses identities as public keys. Nodes are uniquely
identified (by means of network or physical addresses) and
this information is used to exchange keys and encrypt data
to secure communication in the network. This allows the
implementation of a practical public key encryption without
the use of a complex public key infrastructure.
In many ways an identity-based scheme is a perfect so-
lution for sensor networks. There is no need to maintain a
public key directory, as the public keys can be derived from
node’s identities that are widely known in the network. Nodes
generate a public key for a given node only in case when they
want to communicate with it for the first time. After agreeing
upon a shared session key, nodes can use cheap symmetric
key mechanisms (like TinySec [10]) to encrypt the messages
and communicate in a secure manner.
IBC has clear advantages over traditional PKC systems,
but also has some inherent problems. Identity-based schemes
assume the existence of a trusted authority that issues users’
secret keys. This authority is often called the Private Key
Generator (PKG) and can use its master key to decrypt any
user message. It also has the ability to impersonate anybody
in the system. This feature introduces the key escrow problem,
where the security of the whole system depends on the PKG
security. In many cases a single unconditionally trusted entity
in the network simply does not exist.
Fortunately in sensor networks the original network de-
ployer is obviously a trusted authority that can play the role
of PKG. It can generate a unique secret key based on each
node’s identity and preload this information to the node’s
memory before the deployment phase. At this stage a secure
channel clearly exists which allows careful configuration of
the network. We can assign identities to nodes and load all
the required public parameters.
Another problem associated with IBC is key revocation.
When a private key is compromised the owner should change
his identity information corresponding to that private key.
This might be especially problematic in case where identities
are based on the node’s unique physical address (e.g. the
transceiver serial number). That is why we propose to use
network addresses (e.g. TinyOS or IPv6 addresses) for our
identity based cryptosystem. This allows the PKG to assign
new identities to nodes and generate appropriate private keys
to replace the compromised ones.
B. IBC vs other security schemes
Table I summarizes the main advantages of IBC when
compared with other security schemes. It also shows our main
motivations behind choosing an ID-based mechanism to ensure
secure communication in sensor networks.
Symmetric key system is obviously the most lightweight
solution, but it does not address the key distribution problem
and it cannot provide all the required security services. In
addition it requires large number of pair-wise keys to achieve
perfect connectivity. Symmetric key cryptography scheme in
the ZigBee commercial mode needs O(n2) master keys in a
sensor network of n devices [24]. The addition of new nodes in
such a system is also cumbersome, as it requires new keying
material to be added to each existing node. Identity based
scheme clearly decreases the number of necessary keys in
the network and provides a scalable solution that reduces the
storage overhead.
In our IBC scheme we use a unique identity as a public
key rather than relying on certificates and revocation lists, as
used in traditional PKC systems. We do not have to store so
many public keys and the communication overhead related
to key agreement is minimized. We can also send encrypted
information to nodes that have not received their secret keys
yet (forward encryption). With identity based cryptography the
whole key distribution is simplified and easier to manage. IBC
allows us to provide all the security services of a traditional
public key system in a more elegant way and at lower price.
IBC seems to fit perfectly as a solution for the key dis-
tribution problem in WSNs. However before we proceed we
need to ask a basic question. Is such a system even viable
on constrained sensor devices? And if so, can we achieve a
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sufficient level of security? There is a clear correlation between
the level of security achieved, and the processing power
required. We have to set the security parameters of the system
beyond the current cryptanalysis records and demonstrate that
implementation at acceptable speeds is possible on sensor
nodes.
The evaluation results presented in section V show that
our key agreement mechanism is suitable even for the most
constrained sensor nodes like the 8-bit MICAz. This makes
our scheme practical for many different WSN applications,
especially those that are more demanding in terms of security
(see section VI).
III. RELATED WORK
Research results obtained in recent years reject the popular
belief that PKC is infeasible for sensor nodes by showing
that public key primitives can be implemented on embedded
devices [22], [8]. These results show that Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) is a far more efficient PKC method than
RSA in a resource constrained environment.
Although we can apply PKC in WSNs through the use of
ECC primitives, we still need to distribute secret keys and
somehow agree upon mutual keys between pairs of nodes in
the network. We can use the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol (ECDH) [9], but it involves interaction
between the nodes which consumes precious energy. Moreover
this key exchange is not authenticated and can be subjected to
a problematic man-in-the middle attack. It is clear that such a
scheme is not the best security solution for sensor networks.
In the literature there are papers that propose the use of
identities to distribute keys in sensor networks. The authors
in [5], [23], [16] envisioned the use of Identity-Based En-
cryption (IBE) as a security solution for sensor networks. All
three papers proposed the Boneh and Franklin identity-based
encryption scheme [3] to distribute keys in the network. IBE
is based on cryptographic pairings and it was the first practical
IBC scheme.
In [23] the IBE scheme was evaluated through a simulation
on a desktop class computer. The relevance of the achieved
results to WSNs is not clear, as simulation details were not
presented. Doyle et al. in [5] showed the energy consumption
results for the Tate pairing calculation on the ARM7 processor.
This platform, however, is considerably more powerful than
the devices that are currently in use in WSNs. Finally Oliveira
et al. [16], [15] proposed the IBE scheme for sensor networks
and presented the Tate pairing implementation figures for the
MICAz mote. The pairing calculation on its own took 31s
making the whole IBE scheme infeasible for practical sensor
network applications.
In this paper we propose a simple identity-based key
agreement that is not as complex as Boneh and Franklin
IBE and does not require interaction between parties to agree
upon mutual keys. Our scheme uses the ηT pairing and takes
around 4.3s to complete on a MICAz WSN platform. To our
knowledge this work is the first practical implementation of a
complete IBC scheme on sensor devices.
IV. IDENTITY BASED KEY AGREEMENT
Our key agreement scheme for WSNs is based on the
protocol proposed by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara in [17]. We
also use secret key pre-distribution using the secure channel
that exists during the network pre-deployment phase. The
whole scheme is based on the concept of a cryptographic
pairing on elliptic curves. Before we can describe the key
agreement procedure we have to introduce basic definitions
related to pairings.
A. Concepts
A pairing is a bilinear map between two groups. The Tate or
ηT pairings on elliptic curves are examples of such a map. A
bilinear pairing can be defined as follows. Let  be a positive
integer. Let G1 and G2 be additively-written groups of order 
with identity O, and let GT be a multiplicatively-written group
of order  with identity 1. A bilinear pairing is a computable,
non-degenerate function
eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT .
The most interesting property of a cryptographic pairing is
bilinearity. We can say that a map eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT is
bilinear if
eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P, bQ)a = eˆ(aP,Q)b = eˆ(P,Q)ab
for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and all a, b ∈ Zq. Pairings that
are evaluated over supersingular elliptic curves have additional
property of symmetry eˆ(P,Q) = eˆ(Q,P ).
The groups G1 and G2 are implemented using a group
of points on certain special elliptic curves (pairing-friendly
curves) and the group GT is implemented using a multiplica-
tive subgroup of an extension of the underlying finite field.
For certain families of supersingular elliptic curves we have
G1 = G2.
Every cryptographic construction must rely on some hard
problem based on number theory to be secure. Most of the
pairing applications rely on the hardness of the following
problem for their security [7]: given P , aP , bP , and cP for
some a, b, c ∈ Zq, compute eˆ(P, P )abc.
This problem is known as the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Problem (BDHP). The hardness of the BDHP depends on the
hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problems both on E(Fq) and
in Fqk . E(Fq) is an elliptic curve defined over a finite field
Fq, where q is a prime power and Fqk is a k-th extension field.
B. Pre-deployment phase
The original network deployer takes the role of a trusted
authority in our system. He needs to load secret keys into
each node’s memory together with all the public parameters.
Initially he generates the master key s which has to be kept
secret. He also assigns a unique identity to each node that will
participate in the network. For this purpose he can use TinyOS
or IP addresses (in the case of an IPv6 addressing scheme).
In the next step the PKG calculates each node’s private key.
This operation can be performed by the use of ECC primitives.
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The publicly available hash function H is used to derive a
hash value based on the node’s identity NX = H(IDX). The
NX value is mapped to an elliptic curve point via a mapping
function. This allows us to perform the point multiplication
operation with the use of the master key as a scalar, namely
sNX . The result of this operation is a node’s private key. From
the science of elliptic curve cryptography we know that it is
not feasible to derive the s value based on sNX , when the
size of NX in bits is bigger than 160, as this would require
the solution of an intractable discrete logarithm problem1.
Each node is issued with a single secret key sNX , its
identity IDX , hashing function H , mapping function and a
Key Derivation Function (KDF) that is based on a one-way
hash function. KDF is required to derive the session key of a
size that is suitable for a particular symmetric cipher. All these
parameters are preloaded into each node’s memory before the
deployment phase.
C. Key agreement in sensor networks
After the setup process nodes are ready for deployment.
During network operation two nodes A and B that know each
other’s identities can exchange information in a secure way
without any prior interaction. Node A has a private key sA
and node B a key sB. Both sides can independently obtain the
required public keys A and B by calculating A = H(IDA)
and B = H(IDB).
When A wants to setup a pair-wise session key KA,B with B
he calculates the bilinear pairing function eˆ(sA,B). The KDF
function is used to derive the session key from the calculated
pairing value KA,B = KDF (eˆ(sA,B)). Now A can use the
key KA,B to encrypt the message and send it over the radio
channel to B. Node B receives the message and obtains the
decryption key KB,A = KDF (eˆ(sB,A)) to read the packet
payload. Both A and B will end up with the same key since
KA,B = KDF (eˆ(sA,B)) = KDF (eˆ(A,B)s)
= KDF (eˆ(A, sB)) = KDF (eˆ(sB,A)) = KB,A.
This follows from the bilinearity and symmetry properties of
our pairing function. Our protocol allows two nodes to agree
upon a common pair-wise key without any prior interaction
with each other. There is no extra bandwidth overhead associ-
ated with the cryptography, and subverting one node does not
reveal anything about communication between other pairs of
nodes. In case an attacker steals an identity of a node or takes
fake identities he still cannot establish a shared key, because he
does not have the PKG’s master key s and is not issued with
a private key sNX . Our scheme guarantees that the master
secret s is not revealed even if all the nodes are subverted.
The above key agreement scheme is a simple way to
bootstrap security in a sensor network. However we are aware
that this mechanism on its own is not sufficient to secure the
network against any given attack. Our scheme might not be
1this level of security in ECC system is equivalent to 80 bits of security
for symmetric key algorithms [9].
also appropriate for all kinds of WSN applications (see section
VI for suitable applications). The main purpose of this paper
is to propose a secure and practical key agreement mechanism
for sensor networks that will be a foundation for other network
protocols built on top of it.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our identity based key agreement mechanism is based on
the mathematical theory of elliptic curves which involves
operations that are computationally intensive. The implemen-
tation of the whole scheme is quite difficult and requires
cryptographic primitives used in ECC and Pairing-Based Cryp-
tography (PBC). The key distribution is performed mainly
at the beginning of network operation to establish session
keys with neighbouring nodes, and thus the expensive pairing
calculations are very infrequent. We also expect that the
network will use an energy efficient cluster-based routing
protocol. In this case majority of nodes will have to perform
the key agreement only once, when establishing a common
key with their cluster heads.
A. Security parameters
In ECC systems it is not enough to rely only on large
key sizes to provide a high level of security. Other domain
parameters like the selected curve E and an appropriate finite
field Fq are equally important. All these parameters should be
chosen so that the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) is resistant to all known attacks. In the case of the
binary field F2m we should choose our pairing parameters as
k ·m > 1024 [12], where k stands for the embedding degree.
These countermeasures would make any index calculus attack
[9] on the BDHP infeasible for the time being. According
to the above security policy we chose a supersingular elliptic
curve y2 + y = x3 + x over the binary field F2271 with the
embedding degree k = 4.
B. Implementation
In the beginning we have to perform the setup process and
pre-load all the necessary information to sensor nodes. In our
evaluation we do not consider the operations performed by the
trusted authority in the pre-deployment phase. This is done
off-line, and so is not time-critical, and it does not have any
influence on the network performance. In what follows we
focus only on the operations that are carried out by the sensor
nodes during the key agreement scheme.
The overall performance of the identity-based key dis-
tribution mechanism relies on the efficiency of the pairing
calculation eˆ(P,Q). The ηT pairing [2] is one of fastest
known pairings that can be evaluated very efficiently. It uses
a variant of Miller’s algorithm to calculate the pairing. One
of its advantages is that it requires only half the number of
iterations of the Miller’s loop compared with typical pairing
algorithms. That is why we chose the ηT algorithm for all our
implementations. Due to space constraints we cannot present
all the details regarding our pairing implementations. In depth
information can be found in a recent paper [20].
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The ηT pairing evaluates as an element in the F24∗271
extension field. As a result we get a 1084-bit value that can be
used to calculate the mutual session key. The KDF function
derives the appropriate key by hashing the pairing result. In
our implementation we used 128-bit symmetric keys suitable
for the AES block cipher.
To evaluate the efficiency of our scheme we need also to
consider the cost of mapping node identities to elliptic curve
points. One viable method is to hash the identity to the x-
coordinate, and then solve a quadratic equation to find y. We
use the following fast algorithm to solve the y2 + y = c
equation (based on [9]).
Algorithm 1 Solve y2 + y = c (basic version)
INPUT: c =
∑m−1
i=0 ciz
i ∈ F2m where m is odd, trace
Tr(c) = 0 and H(zi) is a half-trace function
OUTPUT: A solution s of y2 + y = c
1: Precompute H(zi) for odd i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 2
2: s← 0
3: for i← (m− 1)/2 to 1 do
4: if c2i = 1 then do: c← c+ zi, s← s+ zi
5: end for
6: s← s+∑(m−1/2)i=1 c2i−1H(z2i−1)
7: return s
When the quadratic equation has no solution we have to
increment x and repeat the process described in Algorithm
1. Otherwise we pick one of the two solutions for y and
multiply the elliptic curve point (x, y) by the large cofactor, to
obtain a point of an appropriate order. This point multiplication
is the most expensive operation in the whole ID mapping
scheme. The performance of ID mapping depends also on
the efficiency of the one-way hash function.
In order to check the performance of our security scheme,
we implemented it on some typical WSN sensor nodes. We
chose three popular hardware platforms used in real-life de-
ployments: the MICAz [4] and Imote2 [1] platforms developed
by Crossbow Technology, and the Tmote Sky [14] developed
by Moteiv corporation. The MICAz device is build upon the
8-bit ATmega128L processor, whereas the Tmote Sky uses the
MSP430F1611 microcontroller. Imote2 is a far more powerful
sensor node with a 32-bit Marvel PXA271 CPU.
To implement pairings we used the MIRACL [18] library
which provides all the necessary tools to perform operations
on elliptic curves. MIRACL was designed mainly for desktop
class computers, and we needed to optimize it for our con-
strained 8, 16, and 32-bit platforms. All memory allocation
in our programs was taken directly from the stack. This
means that after the pairing calculation almost all of the RAM
memory could be re-used for different purposes. As a one-
way hash function we used the popular SHA-1 algorithm. An
efficient implementation of this function for different sensor
devices can be found in the TinyECC [13] package.
C. Results
Table II presents the evaluation results for all the basic
operations that are performed by a single node in our key
agreement scheme. Numbers in brackets tells us how many
times a given routine needs to be performed. As we can
see the pairing calculation is the most expensive operation
in terms of time consumption and memory utilization on all
three platforms. ID mapping also takes considerable amount
of time to complete.
The fact that we were working with a fixed field size (F2271)
allowed us to greatly optimize our code. We used mainly
C code and some assembly language to speed up our time
critical arithmetic routines (in particular binary polynomial
multiplication). On our most constrained 8-bit MICAz device
we were able to compute the pairing in 2.66s – a time
comparable with the scalar point multiplication operation
presented in [21]. The whole key agreement takes as little
as 0.1s on Imote2 and 4.27s in the worst case on the most
constrained mote. All the results presented in Table II assume
7.3828MHz clock rate on MICAz, 8.192MHz on Tmote Sky
and two different default CPU frequencies on Imote2. The
timings for the pairing calculation are acceptable, given that
these operations are performed very rarely and mainly at the
beginning of network operation.
One of the most important issues for sensor devices is
efficient memory utilization. The pairing calculation takes a
significant amount of ROM on all platforms. This is mainly
due to the large size of the ECC library (more than 40KB on
MICAz, around 20KB on Tmote Sky and 25KB on Imote2).
The code needed to perform point multiplication for ID
mapping is also included in this library. Currently we are
working on different ways to optimize the MIRACL library
in order to further decrease its memory footprint. The SHA-1
algorithm takes less than 4KB of ROM on all platforms.
We have also measured the energy consumption of our basic
cryptographic operations. An experimental setup was used for
the MICAz and the Tmote Sky hardware platforms to measure
the current drawn from the batteries during program execution.
As we can see in Table II, the Tmote Sky node is far more
efficient in terms of energy consumption than the MICAz
platform. Imote2 uses even less energy especially when we set
its CPU to 104MHz. Assuming two new AA alkaline batteries
with 2850mAh capacity we can perform around 0.6 million
and more than 2 million of key agreement operations for the
MICAz and the Tmote Sky nodes respectively.
VI. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
There are many practical applications where sensor de-
vices can control the operation of critical equipment, monitor
assembly lines and perform condition based monitoring of
critical structures. For example, sensor devices are deployed
on the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco to monitor
structure vibrations [11]. The importance of security in such an
application justifies the use of a PKC technique to secure the
sensor network. Our ID-based security scheme would facilitate
the deployment of such systems on a larger scale.
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF OUR ID-BASED KEY AGREEMENT ON THREE WSN HARDWARE PLATFORMS.
8-bit MICAz 16-bit Tmote Sky 32-bit Imote2 (13MHz) 32-bit Imote2 (104MHz)
Time ROM Energy Time ROM Energy Time ROM Energy Time ROM Energy
Pairing(x1) 2.66s 47.41KB 62.73mJ 1.71s 23.66KB 17.70mJ 0.46s 29.55KB 12.12mJ* 0.06s 29.55KB 3.76mJ*
ID mapping(x1) 1.55s 0.72KB 36.55mJ 1.07s 0.48KB 11.07mJ 0.28s 0.66KB 7.38mJ* 0.03s 0.66KB 2.47mJ*
Hashing(x4) 15ms 3.68KB 0.35mJ 11ms 2.44KB 0.11mJ 1.4ms 2.81KB 37µJ* 0.17ms 2.81KB 10µJ*
Total 4.27s 51.81KB 99.63mJ 2.82s 26.58KB 29.21mJ 0.75s 33.02KB 19.65mJ* 0.1s 33.02KB 6.27mJ*
* - based on manufacturer data
We can identify a whole range of commercial applications
that are deployed in public areas, where the threat of a physical
attack is larger than usual. This application range include water
quality monitoring, tunnel lighting control, street traffic and
parking monitoring. In our security scheme each node employs
asymmetric cryptography primitives. Thanks to that the effect
of a node being compromised is strictly local and does not
affect the communication between other nodes in the network.
In many cases commercial buildings waste vast amounts
of energy by inefficient Heating, Ventilation and Air Condi-
tioning (HVAC) usage. WSNs can provide intelligent control
based on precise real-time measurements to reduce the energy
consumption of those systems. Sensor networks can also
provide energy monitoring and automatic meter readings in
our homes. All such systems require reliable security solutions
that will allow wider deployments in the real world. Our
authenticated key agreement can establish secure network
connectivity and may help to achieve appropriate security
levels for those applications.
There are also other important applications in the military
and health-care spheres, where security has the highest pri-
ority. Such systems must depend on public-key technology
in order to fulfil all the security requirements. Our ID-based
key agreement is a scalable PKC solution for dynamic sensor
networks that sets the stage for an array of new and innovative
applications.
VII. CONCLUSION
The application of ID-based cryptosystems to WSNs has a
very promising future. This direction is especially interesting
as more powerful nodes are being developed that allow more
complex security protocols. In this paper we have shown that
appropriately designed ID-based scheme might be a perfect
solution for the key distribution problem in sensor networks.
We have also identified particular WSN applications that may
especially benefit from this security architecture. Our evalua-
tion results have shown that this key agreement is feasible and
practical on different WSN platforms and can be evaluated in
around 4.3s on a tiny 8-bit sensor device.
In our future work, we plan to investigate techniques that
can further speed up the execution and reduce the memory
consumption for our scheme. We will also explore the possi-
bilities of providing broadcast authentication in WSNs.
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